Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 32

Issue 1

Article 3

Winter 1-1-1975

The Inflation Crunch And Relief For Government Contractors
Under Public Law 85-804
Richard C. Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Government Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard C. Johnson, The Inflation Crunch And Relief For Government Contractors Under Public
Law 85-804, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 5 (1975).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol32/iss1/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

THE INFLATION CRUNCH AND RELIEF FOR
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS UNDER PUBLIC
LAW 85-804
RICHARD C. JOHNSON*

Among those hardest hit by the drastic inflation surge in the
United States are government contractors with long-term fixed price
contracts for construction or for major systems such as Naval ships,
those with multi-year contracts for supplies or services that may
extend for as many as five years,I and those with contracts containing
option clauses for as much as fifty percent of the basic quantity at
no increase in unit price. 2 One example of 1973-74 inflationary price
increases experienced by a major Navy shipbuilder was brought out
in recent hearings before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee: wire rope, 76%; gasoline, 40%; diesel fuel, 113%;
bunker C fuel, 153%; steel shot, 97%; and copper cable, 71%.1 Clearly,
this type of drastic cost increase, while not unique to contractors who
deal with the government, is a cause for major concern among contractors and government officials alike.
The inflation crunch is especially severe for government contractors, however, because they have traditionally faced a buyerdominated market in which contract terms and conditions are offered
on a take it or leave it basis. Once into the period of performance,
government contractors consequently confront a formidable bureaucracy characterized by limited flexibility in responding to the radically
changed circumstances presented by such developments as doubledigit inflation. Unlike his civilian counterpart, the government contracting officer has little or no power to adjust contract prices when
equity or practical considerations require,4 and his authority in general is limited by a bewildering array of regulatory and decisional
law.5
*Member, vor Baur, Coburn, Simmons & Turtle, Washington, D.C.; B.A. (1958),
L.L.B. (1962), Harvard University.
See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 1.322-1(a) (1974).
2 See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 1.1504(a) (1974). The percentage may be increased "when
unusual circumstances exist."
3 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Armed Services Committee
on "Overall Shipyard Situation," August 13, 1974 (unpublished transcript on file at
Washington & Lee Law Review), at 953.
See generally R. NASH & J. Cmirnc, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW, 201-06, 974-76

(2d ed. 1969).
1 Id. at 77-85.

6

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

Faced with the severe economic losses by continued dealings with
the government, companies fortunate enough to find alternate purchasers for their goods and services may turn away from government
contracting altogether. In the long run, however, any substantial exodus of firms from government procurement would seriously damage
the national interest and ought not to be accepted by responsible
federal policy makers. Moreover, a very large part of the problem
exists in the present and cannot be avoided. Companies that accepted relatively long term fixed-price contracts between 1971 and
1973 are now confronted by tremendous losses created by the energy
crisis and double-digit inflation.' Should federal officials fail to
respond effectively, business failures and resulting unemployment
will inevitably curtail the flow of necessary goods and services required to support vital government programs. Yet the government's
response itself can be inflationary and government contractors cannot
reasonably expect relief to be granted wholly without regard to the
nation's fundamental anti-inflationary policies.
One of the limited safety valves which might protect government
contractors against the ravages of double-digit inflation is the availability of "extraordinary contractual relief' under Public Law 85-804.7
Although it can be administered to provide some relief in its present
form, it may need to be adjusted to meet the present crisis.

I.

THE STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK

Public Law 85-804, enacted in 1958, empowers the President "to
enter into contracts or into amendments or modifications of contracts
• . . without regard to other provisions of law relating to the making,
performance, amendment, or modification of contracts, whenever he
deems that such action would facilitate the national defense." 8 Thus,
' For example, in the Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Armed
Services Committee on the "Overall Shipyard Situation," August 6,1974 (unpublished
transcript on file at Washington & Lee Law Review), at 863, the following statement
was made by Mr. John P. Diesel, President of Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company:
... on existing contracts, we are faced with the problem of an inflationary impact not foreseen by either the Navy or the shipbuilders at
the time of contracting and parenthetically, I might add, not foreseen
by either Government or private economists. A mutually acceptable
solution to this dilemma on existing contracts must be reached.
7 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-35 (1970).
Act of August 28, 1958, Public Law 85-804, 72 Stat. 972, as amended, Public Law
93-155, Nov. 16, 1973, 87 Stat. 615, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-35 (1974). The predecessor
statute dating from World War II, and the numerous extensions thereof, was known
as Title II of the First War Powers Act. 55 Stat. 839 (1941). See also R. NASH & J.
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the statute in its broadest sense removes the prohibition against making amendments to contracts without consideration, and vests in the
executive branch a wide-ranging discretion to remedy inequities in
its contractual dealings, such as those created by the current surge
of inflation. The authority of the Act was initially granted by executive order to the Department of Defense, and was extended later to
a number of other departments and agencies Implementation of
the Act is found in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations,' 0
the Federal Procurement Regulations," and the separate regulations
3
of AEC' 2 and NASA.'
The regulations provide generally 4 that a request for extraordinary contractual relief such as an increase in contract price may be
filed with the cognizant contracting officer.' 5 However, review and
final disposition by the agency are confined to a Contract Adjustment
Board or other officials at the secretarial or equivalent level.' 6

II.

RELIEF FOR "ESSENTIALITY TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE" IN INFLATION

CASES

Although the statute is couched in extraordinarily sweeping
terms, the implementing regulations have purported to limit its application by delineating specific circumstances under which relief
CIarNIc,

FEDERAL

PROCUREMENT LAw, 976-78 (2d ed. 1969). The 1973 amendment places

a $25,000,000 limitation upon any obligation under the statute unless the respective
Armed Services Committee shall first have been notified and neither House has
adopted within 60 days a resolution disapproving such obligation. For a general discussion of P.L. 85-804 and its predecessors, see Jansen, PublicLaw 85-804 and Extraordinary ContractualRelief, 55 GEO. L.J. 959-1017 (1967).
1 Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, Atomic Energy
Commission, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Government Printing Office. Exec.
Order No. 10789 (1958), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11382, 3 C.F.R. 80-85 (1974).
" 32 C.F.R. § 17.000 et seq. (1974).
" 41 C.F.R. § 1-17.000 et seq. (1974).
12 41 C.F.R. § 9-17.101 et seq. (1974).
,541 C.F.R. § 18-17.000 et seq. (1974).
" This discussion refers to the Armed Services Procurement Regulation which
was closely followed in the later development of regulations applicable to the other
agencies. Exec. Order No. 10789, Nov. 15, 1958, as amended, provides in paragraph
22 that "[Sluch regulations of other agencies shall, to the extent practicable, be
uniform with the regulations prescribed or approved by the Secretary of Defense
..... " Exec. Order No. 10789, 3 C.F.R. 80-85 (1974). Any significant differences will
be noted.
'5 32 C.F.R. § 17.207-1 (1974).
, E.g., 32 C.F.R. § 17.202 (1974). The Board for each Military Department consists of a Chairman and from two to six other members.
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may be granted. The first such area directly relevant to drastic and
unforeseen inflation is that of "essentiality" to the national defense:
Where an actual or threatened loss under a defense contract, however caused, will impair the productive ability of a
contractor whose continued performance on any defense contracts or whose continued operation as a source of supply is
found to be essential to the national defense, the contract may
be adjusted but only to the extent necessary to avoid such
impairment to the contractor's productive ability.'7
The words "actual or threatened loss . . . however caused" remove any possible requirement of causation that might otherwise
exist in inflation cases. Indeed, far from having to establish any particular excusable cause for their losses, contractors have been granted
relief under this provision when their losses were caused by "unrelated operations"' 8 or even a "lack of competent management."' 9
Moreover, the words "impair the productive ability" and "essential
to the national defense" are not self-limiting and can be broadly
construed to include almost any defense-related activity that is experiencing severe inflation losses under contracts with the government.
However, the full potential of this regulatory language has not been
utilized to date in the decisions of the Contract Adjustment Boards.
A.

Impairment of Productive Ability

For a contractor to establish impairment of productive ability, the
Contract Adjustment Boards have consistently required a showing of
close to actual insolvency and imminent production stoppage. The
fact that a tremendous loss may be incurred on a particular contract
or contracts has generally had no bearing provided the contractor has
the resources with which to continue. Thus, if the contractor fails to
show either insolvency or imminent production stoppage, relief will
ordinarily be denied.
Circumstances that have been held to meet the Board-developed
insolvency requirement include deficit working capital and inability
,7 32 C.F.R. § 17.204-2(a) (1974). See also 41 C.F.R. § 1-17.204-2(a) (1974); 41
C.F.R. § 18-17.103-2(a) (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 9-17.204-51(a) (1974).
'8 Doughboy Indus., Inc., ACAB 1089 (23 Feb. 1968), 2 EXTRAORDINARY CONTRACTUAL RELIEF REPORTER (Federal Publications, Inc., David V. Anthony and Carl L.
Vacketta, Editors, 1974, hereinafter cited as ECR) 54, at 4.
, Memcor, Inc., ACAB 1080 (12 Sept. 1966), 2 ECR 17, at 4.
Belock Instrument Corp., ACAB 1049 (17 Aug. 1962), 1 ECR 135; S.W. Electronics & Mfg. Corp., NCAB (27 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR 147, at 3-4.
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to discharge current liabilities,"0 continuous cash shortages," inabil-

ity to obtain commercial financing of any kind,2 actual or threatened
'3
vendor action to halt deliveries of subcontracted parts and supplies,
and imminent bankruptcy.24 Conversely, relief has been denied even
where a contractor has demonstrated losses of $4.5 million in two
years and a decrease in shareholders' equity from $11.2 million to $6.5
million. Because the contractor's total assets and current assets increased, the Board found "no evidence that the solvency of the Contractor. . . is presently endangered by the losses."2 In another case,
the NASA Board found that "although the. Contractor has demonstrated that it has suffered a loss on the contract involved in this
request for relief, the profit and loss data and statement of assets and
liabilities submitted do not reveal symptoms of insolvency or other
indication that the Contractor's continued operation is endangered.""
Where the insolvency standard has been met, relief has readily
been granted for inflation cases. In Servrite International,Ltd. ,'2 a
1973 Navy Contract Adjustment Board case, the impairment was
created by "unanticipated cost increases" including "unforeseen
[Italian] increased wage rates and social contributions due to run
away inflation" and "higher than anticipated utility rates established
by local Italian authorities as a result of unstable economic conditions in the country." Relief was also granted in Hol-GarManufacturing Corp.,2 a fixed-price contract for generator sets. The contract
was awarded in June 1973, and 812 sets had been ordered as of February 1974. During this period, production costs increased by approximately 20%, in part due to inflation30 and in part due allegedly to
defective Government drawings. In Allegheny Metal Stamping Co.,3'
fixed-price contracts were awarded in December 1972, and June 1973,
21

Memcor, Inc., ACAB 1080 (12 Sept. 1966), 2 ECR

17.

" S.W. Electronics & Mfg. Corp., NCAB (27 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR 147, at 3-4.
2 Doughboy Indus., Inc., ACAB 1089 (23 Feb. 1968), 2 ECR 54.
" Servrite Int'l, Ltd., NCAB (5 Nov. 1973), 2 ECR
201, at 2; S.W. Electronics
& Mfg. Corp., NCAB (27 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR 147, at 3-4.
2' Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co., AFCAB 206 (18 Jan. 1971), 2 ECR 120, at 3.
2 Quinn Constr. Co., NASACAB (28 Nov. 1967), 2 ECR 43, at 4.
21 NCAB (5 Nov. 1973), 2 ECR 201.
2 2 ECR 201, at 2. The percentages of the cost increases over original projections
are not specified in the decision.
AFCAB 221 (7 Feb. 1974) (unpublished decision).
Id. at 2. The contracting officer estimated a price increase on repurchase from
another source of approximately 20% due solely to the "inflationary trend of prices
generally."
31 ACAB 1154 (14 Mar. 1974), 3 ECR 5.
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for 5.56mm cartridge clips. Thereafter, the price of steel rose 23% and
the price of copper 90% with the result that the contractor could not
continue production. In this instance the Board not only granted
relief of $129,257 but also authorized the contracting officer to include
escalation provisions in the contracts to provide both for future increases in the costs of the copper and steel and for the satisfactory
32
completion of the contract.
A narrow exception to the strictures of the insolvency rule may
exist, however, if the contractor can show three things: (1) that he has
suffered a severe loss on current contracts; (2) that he is an essential
or sole source of supply for items as to which future requirements are
firm; and (3) that although not presently threatened with insolvency,
he will be, or may be, unable to undertake performance of those
future contracts. The only case meeting these requirements is Amron
3
Corp., which was decided by the Army Contract Adjustment Board.
The contractor was a designated Mobilization Base supplier for nine
defense items. Of these items, Amron's production constituted a significant part of the total national capacity for six items for which it
was the single active source; for the other three it represented 100%
of the total U.S. base capacity.34 A contract was awarded in January
1973 for 20mm brass cartridge cases at a fixed price with no escalation, and with a Government option to increase the quantity by 50%.35
Between January and October, 1973, the price of brass increased
about 48%.36
For these reasons, and despite the absence of a showing that
Amron faced any prospect of insolvency during production on its
current contract, the Board found that "the threatened loss . . . will
seriously impair Amron's ability to continue as a source of supply,"
and granted relief calculated as the amount "Amron requires to
'37
maintain its productive ability as a source of supply.
It would be unjustified to view the Amron case alone as a clear
signal that the insolvency rule is about to be relaxed. Amron had solesource status and the Army Board could do little else but grant some
form of relief. Thus, under the Boards' current reasoning, with the
Amron exception noted, inflation cases based on "impairment" must
32

Id.

5, at 2. See also Libby Welding Co., ACAB 1163 (4 Sept. 1974), 3 ECR

23; Kisco Co., ACAB 1167 (10 Oct. 1974), 3 ECR 1 24.
3
ACAB 1155 (1 May 1974), 3 ECR 8. For some reason, the same decision is
reported as ACAB 1155A (7 June 1974), 3 ECR 12.
3
3 ECR 8, at 3.
3 Id. 8, at 1.
36 Id. 8, at 2.
31Id. 8, at 3-4.
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still pass the stringent brink-of-insolvency test. That test, however,
is unnecessarily restrictive. Severe financial losses created by runaway inflation may seriously impair a contractor's productive ability
without bringing him to the point of insolvency. A contractor may,
for example, be unable to make needed capital investments in
defense-related equipment or facilities, thus making him less active
as a competitor in the future. Moreover, once a contractor reaches the
brink of insolvency, it is often too late to provide effective relief to
him on other than a stop-gap basis, and his long-term availability as
a source of supply and a competitor for government business may
already be lost.
Most significantly, the strictures of the impairment rule as interpreted by the Boards do not reflect the realities of the current inflation crunch, since massive inflation losses may strike both a wellfunded business and the marginal producer alike. However, policy
changes may be in the wind at the highest level of at least the Department of Defense. A June 12, 1974, policy memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations & Logistics) to the Assistant
Service Secretaries (I&L) calls attention to economic problems
attributable to energy-related shortages 38 and cites Public Law 85-804
as one method of coping with the resulting inequities. The memorandum states in pertinent part:
[W]hen actual or threatened loss under a Defense contract
will impair the productive ability of the contractor whose continued performance is essential to the national defense, consideration can and has been given to requests for relief under the
provisions of Public Law 85-804, on a case by case basis.
It is not our intent or desire to cause well managed contractors large or small, to suffer loss. Neither is it our intent or
desire to add fuel to the fire of spiraling prices by being willing
to pay any amount asked. But, we should continue to take
positive action for easing the gross uncertainties in price fluc3 9
tuation where warranted.
It concludes by instructing the Service Secretaries to insure that
the procurement sections of their respective agencies are cognizant of
the problems and various techniques for getting through the current
period of price instability." This welcome policy change at the Deu BNA

FEDERAL CONTRACTS REPORT

1, Id. at A-23.
40 Id.

539 (July 15, 1974).
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partment of Defense should pave the way for meaningful action by
the Contract Adjustment Boards on the inflation front.
B.

Essentiality to the National Defense

Assuming that a contractor has passed the impairment test, he
must still meet the regulatory standard of "essential to the national
defense." This standard, however, encompasses a wide variety of
goods and services; for example, electronic components and systems,4 ' dairy supplies,42 back-up aircraft radio receivers,43 airfield
communications equipment," generator sets, 5 and ammunition components." Thus, the nature of articles or services provided has not
posed any serious obstacle to the Boards' granting relief in otherwise
appropriate cases. Relief has not been limited to producers of firstline combat equipment. Moreover, "essentiality" does not require a
contractor to establish that he is a sole source, but only that his
productive capacity is needed and cannot be replaced by an alternative source within reasonable constraints of time or money. A time
lag of from three to eighteen months in securing replacement items
has been held sufficient, as has an excess cost of 21% or greater."
The excess cost criterion should be easily met in severe inflation
cases, since the cause of the applicant's losses would by definition be
applicable to any alternative producer of the same item, e.g., a drastic rise in the price of copper or petrochemicals. However, the other
half of the test-the time criterion-is less readily satisfied. Under
current decisions, relief would not be available to the producer of a
common, off-the-shelf item, notwithstanding a drastic unforeseen
increase in the price of labor or materials.48 Here again, the DepartBelock Instrument Corp., ACAB 1049 (17 Aug. 1962), 1 ECR 135.
4zServrite Int'l, Ltd., NCAB (5 Nov. 1973), 2 ECR 201.
S.W. Electronics & Mfg. Corp., NCAB (27 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR 147.
" Doughboy Indus., Inc., ACAB 1089 (23 Feb. 1968), 2 ECR 54.
,3Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp., AFCAB 221 (7 Feb. 1974) (unpublished decision).
46 Allegheny Metal Stamping Co., ACAB 1154 (14 Mar. 1974), 3 ECR 1 5; Amron
Corp., ACAB 1155 (1 May 1974), 3 ECR 18.
,1E.g., Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp., AFCAB 221 (7 Feb. 1974) (unpublished decision) (1215 months and approximately 21% excess cost); Servrite Int'l, Ltd., NCAB (5
Nov.1973), 2 ECR 201 (12 months and about $1 million annually); S. W. Electronics
& Mfg. Corp., NCAB (27 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR 147 (12-18 months and approximately
100% excess cost); Doughboy Indus., Inc., ACAB 1089 (23 Feb. 1968), 2 ECR T54 (1216 months, excess cost not specified); Memcor, Inc., ACAB 1080 (12 Sept. 1966), 2 ECR
T 17 (7-8 months and overall loss of $11 million); Belock Instrument Corp., ACAB 1049
(17 Aug. 1962), 1 ECR 135 (3-8 months and approximately 31% excess cost).
4'See Lane Sales, Inc., ACAB 1169 (4 Nov. 1974) (unpublished decision) (relief
denied where "there are other contractors who can supply similar products . . ").
'3
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ment of Defense policy memorandum of June 12, 1974,11 appears to
call for some broadening of the standards applied by the Boards. It
is reasonable to argue, for example, that at least the unprecedented
short-term spurt of inflation caused by the energy crisis should be
met by a temporarily broadened definition of "essentiality" to include all companies that produce necessary defense-related items,
whether or not more than one source is readily available. If not, the
burden of those inflated prices will fall inequitably on the producers
who by mere chance hold contracts negotiated between 1972 and
1974, which no doubt includes many of the most highly valued
producers of defense-related material.
C.

The Scope of Relief Granted for Essentiality

The monetary relief necessary in inflation cases should be related
to the extraordinary and unforeseen increases in labor or material
costs experienced by contractors. However, the regulations that presently govern "essentiality" cases prescribe relief in terms of "the
extent necessary to avoid such impairment to the contractor's productive ability." 0 As interpreted by the Boards this standard bears
no necessary relation to the amount of the loss suffered. In one case
involving a five-year contract term, the Navy Board limited relief to
a one year period which represented the time required to establish
another comparable source.5' In another, the Board limited relief to
the minimum necessary to complete the contracts in question and
additionally imposed the strictures of an advance payment controlled
account, and even specified that $150,000 of the amount granted
should be "the corpus of a loan which shall be subject to the terms
"52
of a loan agreement ...
However, two recent cases both involving inflation suggest that
the Boards may be moving toward a broadened interpretation of the
regulation. In Allegheny Metal Stamping Co.,53 the Army Board'
granted $129,257 out of the $158,163 requested in order to permit
continued production and contract completion, and in addition authorized the contracting officer to include an escalation clause to
cover future increases in the costs of the copper and steel.5 The latter
See note 38 supra.
32 C.F.R. § 17.204-2(a) (1974). See also 41 C.F.R. § 1-17.204-2(a) (1974).
, Servrite Int'l, Ltd., NCAB (5 Nov. 1973), 2 ECR 201, at 5.

"

147, at 4-5. See
" S.W. Electronics & Mfg. Corp., NCAB (27 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR
also Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp., AFCAB 221 (7 Feb. 1974) (unpublished decision).
ACAB 1154 (14 Mar. 1974), 3 ECR 5, at 2.
54Id.
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provision clearly had the effect of relieving the contractor of future
losses due to material price increases, whether or not such future
increases would impair his ability to complete the contracts. In
Amron Corp.,'' the Army Board relieved the contractor of virtually
all loss on the contract attributable to increases in the price of brass.
The contractor projected his loss at $553,748; the Board granted
$549,87151 on the basis of audit substantiation of the loss figure. The
award was made without regard to any amount necessary for the
contractor's continued production on any particular contract.
III.

INFLATION CASES AND "MUTUAL MISTAKE AS TO A MATERIAL FAcT"

A second avenue of relief of potentially great importance to contractors with serious inflation losses is the "mutual mistake" rule.
Regulations provide that "[a] contract may be amended or modified
to correct or mitigate the effect of a mistake, including. . . a mutual
mistake as to a material fact."5 As applied by the Boards so far, this
provision has had only limited application to inflation cases. It may
become of much greater significance if the present inflation crisis
results in a spurt of new cases before the Boards.
A.

Material Facts in Existence as of the Date of ContractAwards

Relief for mutual mistake has not generally been granted unless
the parties were mistaken as to some material fact in existence as of
the date of contract award.58 For example, in J. A. Maurer, Inc., 9
both parties entered into a contract on the assumption that a particular type and brand of photographic film would be available for use
throughout performance. In fact, however, the film manufacturer had
discontinued production fifteen months prior to the contract award
and a new and different film had to be used, resulting in increased
ACAB 1155 (1 May 1974), 3 ECR 8.
8, at 3.
57 32 C.F.R. § 17.204-3(c) (1974). The same provision is included in the Federal
Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-17.204-3 (1974). Both regulations also refer to
mistakes or ambiguities as to what was intended to be expressed in the written
instrument, and obvious mistakes on the contractor's part that should have been
apparent to the contracting officer prior to award. However, neither of these latter
provisions appears to be applicable to mistakes arising out of increases in the inflation
rate. For typical applications of these provisions, see, e.g., Northrop Corp., ACAB
1129 (28 Mar. 1972), 2 ECR 165; General Elec. Co., ACAB 1126 (22 Feb. 1972), 2
ECR 160.
" E.g., Servrite Int'l, Ltd., NCAB (5 Nov. 1973), 2 ECR
201, at 3; The Magnavox Co., ACAB 1100 (17 April 1969), 2 ECR 84, at 3.
11AFCAB 200 (28 Jan. 1969), 2 ECR 77.
5' Id.
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performance costs. On these facts the Air Force Board found that
"the contract and the contracting officer incorrectly assumed at the
time of award that Eastman Kodak type S0-1060 film would be
available. . . ...
and granted the requested relief.60 In Genisco Technology Corp.,"1 both parties relied, in entering into the contract, on a
feasibility study setting forth certain technical solutions that had
been prepared by another contractor. Some of these technical solutions later proved to be faulty and contract costs increased accordingly. Relief was granted by the Board "on the ground of mutual
mistake."62
Conversely, relief has generally been refused for mere errors in
judgment in forecasting future events, including unanticipated inflation. In Servrite International,Ltd., 3 the contractor claimed relief
under mutual mistake for unanticipated inflationary wage and cost
increases in Italy, alleging that both parties failed to anticipate the
extraordinary rate of inflation and also failed accurately to assess the
Italian labor market." However, the Navy Board rejected this theory
of recovery:
In this case, the parties do not contend that they were in error
with regard to a fact existing at the time of contracting, but
rather, mutual mistake is theorized on the basis of the parties
[sic] inability to foresee the future: in essence, to prophesize
the occurrence of abnormalinflation. The Board does not consider this lack of foresight to constitute a mutual mistake upon
which relief can be granted.65
In Waterman Steamship Corp.,66 the Board denied relief notwithstanding the fact that seamen's wages had increased at a rate that
was 480% of what the contractor had projected due to unanticipated
high arbitration awards. Because of these increases the contractor's
losses under the multi-year ship charter contract were projected at
not less that $11.2 million. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the
loss, the Board denied relief:
Id. 77, at4.
, NASACAB (20 Oct. 1967), 2 ECR 40.
Id. 40, at 5.
NCAB (5 Nov. 1973), 2 ECR 201. See also General Shelter Corp., AFCAB 214
(31 Aug. 1971), 2 ECR 145, at 2; McNamara Constr. of Manitoba, Ltd., ACAB 1109
(11 May 1970), 2 ECR T 114, at 2.
64 2 ECR T 201, at 3. Although the Board rejected the contractor's "mutual mistake" theory, relief was granted under the "insolvency" standard. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
2 ECR 201, at 3 (emphasis added).
" NCAB (21 Nov. 1969), 2 ECR
99.
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Waterman erred only in its forecasts of what future events
would bring, and a mistake of judgment concerning the extent of future wage increases is a shortcoming which this Board
cannot cure as a mutual mistake of fact. Waterman's request
for relief on this basis is accordingly denied."
Despite the strong language of the above cases, there have been
5
exceptions. In Frank P. Williamson,"
the Air Force Board found a
mutual mistake where the parties had assumed that the contractor
would be able to continue to raise hogs under a garbage removal
contract-, but where the hogs died and new ones could not be raised
on the same land for several years. It seems clear that there was no
mutual mistake as to an existing fact in this case. The mistake, if
any, was in the failure to foresee future events. Thus, the requirement
that there be established a mutual mistake existing at the date of
contract award does not constitute a complete bar to otherwise meritorious applications.
B.

Relief Available in Inflation Cases

The Boards have experienced no difficulty in granting relief in
inflation cases where a mutual mistake can somehow be related back
to the time of the contract award. In The Magnavox Corp.,"° the
parties included an escalation factor based on the Wholesale Price
Index for "Television, Radio Receivers, and Phonographs,"" in a
contract for electronics equipment. As it turned out, however, this
index consistently went down due to the impact of Japanese imports.
Meanwhile, domestic costs went up. The Board determined that the
"wrong" escalation index had been used and that if the parties had
examined the situation closely at the time of contract award, they
would have noted the downward trend of the index and caught the
error. From this the Board concluded that relief under "mutual mistake" was appropriate and so ordered." The same situation arose in
2 ECR 99, at 3.
61AFCAB 118 (14 June 1961), 1 ECR 72. See also Advance Maintenance Corp.,
AFCAB 205 (21 April 1970), 2 ECR 111 (relief granted where the contractor could
not reasonably foresee the "prevailing wage rates" that would be set by the contracting
officer); Atlas Fabricators, Inc., AFCAB 220 (3 July 1973), 2 ECR 192 (contractor
released from obligation to provide option quantity where material costs had increased
87

40%).
11ACAB 1100 (17 April 1969), 2 ECR I 84.
71 Id. T 84, at 1 (emphasis in original).
71Id. $ 84, at 3.
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PolaradElectronics,Inc.,72 and the same result was reached.13
Relief was also granted in two cases that do not readily fit within
the "mutual mistake" rule. Northern Metal Co.74 involved a contract
for terminal services, stevedoring, and processing for vehicles which
contained a 10% price escalation limitation "based on general experience known to the parties concerned at the time the contract was
entered into."7 5 The Board determined that the contractor encountered losses due to two factors: (1) the Army's failure to use the
quantity of services earlier predicted; and (2) cost increases above
the escalation ceiling. The Board held that the inclusion of the 10%
escalation ceiling was not a mutual mistake, but was a unilateral
mistake on the part of the government:
5.....
.Setting the limitation at ten percent was a mistake on the part of the government and should be corrected
under the authority of Section 17.204.3 of ASPR.
6. The effect of the ten percent limitation under the present circumstances, including the abnormal wage increase negotiated by the ILA, and the substantially reduced tonnage
being shipped to contractor's facility by the Government, constitutes an injustice not contemplated by the parties during
the prolonged discussions and exchange of information at the
time the contract was negotiated. This, as a matter of fairness,
76
should be rectified.
This award is almost a total contradiction of the Board decision in
Waterman Steamship Corp."
INDUS,. GmbH,75 involved a contract for the construction and
leasing to U.S. military personnel of family housing in Germany. The
contract contained a guaranteed rental rate not to exceed $185 per
month per unit for a period of ten years, with no escalation. The
- ACAB 1116 (27 April 1971), 2 ECR 134.
" Id. 134, at 2. "The Board finds that Code 1-25 was inappropriate and inadequate as a price index in the escalation clause of this contract and that this was a
material fact regarding which there was a mutual mistake by the parties to the contract."
7 ACAB 1146 (29 Aug. 1973), 2 ECR
196.
71Id. 196, at 1.
1' Id. 196, at 2. The reasoning of the case is confused by the fact that the Board
also found the contractor's continued operation to be "essential to the national defense," suggesting that reliance was also placed on the "essentiality" provisions of the
regulation.
17NCAB (21 Nov. 1969), 2 ECR 99.
1' ACAB 1152 (9 Jan. 1974), 3 ECR 2.
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guaranteed rental rate was equal to the statutory guarantee limitation then in effect. The contractor incurred substantially increased
costs and sought relief which the Board granted on the grounds that
failure to include an escalation clause covering the guaranteed rental
was a "mistake." The Board did not explain what the mistake was
or how it arose. It did note that Congress raised the statutory ceiling
from $185 to $275 subsequent to negotiation of the contract, thereby
implying that the "mistake" was the failure of the parties to foresee
that the congressional limitation might change. 9
Altogether, the cases do not chart any clear course for the Boards
to follow in today's inflationary situation. It would seem appropriate,
however, for the mutual mistake rule to be broadened sufficiently at
least to accomodate the drastic price increases occasioned by the
1973-74 energy crisis. These dramatic changes could not have been
foreseen in any contracts negotiated either in 1972 or in the first three
quarters of 1973. Therefore it could be reasoned with at least as little
resort to fiction as in past decisions, that the failure to include adequate escalation clauses in these contracts constituted a mutual mistake within the meaning of the regulation.
C.

Scope of Relief Granted

Relief in mutual mistake cases may take the form of whole or
partial rescission of the contract at no cost to either party. 0 However,
in a number of cases a remedy resembling reformation has been
granted, resulting directly or indirectly in a price increase.8 ' And in
a few cases, the remedy has approximated an "equitable adjustment"
for increased costs under the Changes Clause. 2 Any of these remedies
,1 Id.
80

2, at 2.

E.g., Frank P. Williamson, AFCAB 118 (14 June 1961), 1 ECR

72 (cancellation

of the entire contract at no cost to the government); Atlas Fabricators, Inc., AFCAB
220, (3 July 1973), 2 ECR 192 (rescission of the option quantity at no cost to the
government).
8, INDUS, GmbH, ACAB 1152 (9 Jan. 1974), 3 ECR 2 (authorization to negotiate an escalation clause that would result in higher guaranteed rentals for the contractor); Northern Metal Co., ACAB 1146 (29 Aug. 1973), 2 ECR 196 (removal of escalation ceiling and payment of an amount representing the contractor's loss); Polarad
134 (substitution of a new
Electronics, Inc., ACAB 1116 (27 April 1971), 2 ECR
escalation index, resulting in a price increase of $165,399); Advance Maintenance
Corp., AFCAB 205 (21 April 1970), 2 ECR T 111 (price increase of $46,684 to compensate for higher than reasonably foreseeable "prevailing wage rates").
J. A. Maurer, Inc., AFCAB 200 (28 Jan. 1969), 2 ECR 77 (compensation for
increased costs caused by the nonavailability of a specific photographic film); Genisco
Technology Corp., NASACAB (20 Oct. 1967), 2 ECR 40 (compensation for increased
costs caused by mistaken assumptions as to the feasibility of certain technical solutions).
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may be appropriate in a given inflation case-i.e., rescission where
the contractor has yet to incur any substantial cost under the contract, and reformation or equitable adjustment where continued performance is considered to be in the government's best interest.
Hence, the remedies presently available for mutual mistake are
adequate to meet the equities of inflation cases.
IV.
AND

LOSSES DUE TO GOVERNMENT ACTION: THE SOVEREIGN ACT
ExCEPTIONS

RULE

rrs

One other area in which recovery has been allowed under Public
Law 85-804 should be closely examined. Regulations provide that
relief may be afforded "[w]here a contractor suffers a loss (not
merely a diminution of anticipated profits) on a defense contract as
a result of Government action.. . ."0 The regulation goes on to state
that "[wihere the government action is directed primarily at the
contractor and is taken by the Government in its capacity as the
other contracting party, the contract may be adjusted
....
"8 This
latter provision has been read to create a sovereign act rule in "government action" cases, and to close the door firmly on relief where
the only acts complained of are those of the government in its general
capacity, such as embargos, devaluations and inflationary economic
policies or actions.
In S. W. Electronics & Manufacturing Corp.," a contractor asked
for relief on the grounds that a government embargo on shipments to
Pakistan created a severe loss situation that threatened his performance on other government contracts. However, the Board found that
the government act complained of equally affected all United States
firms and accordingly ruled that no basis for granting relief existed."
In R.E. Lee Electric Co.,8" the contractor complained that increased
government demand for copper had led to a drastic price rise. However, the Board denied relief, labeling the facts as "classic examples
of sovereign acts for which relief is not ordinarily granted.""
In Fargo Shipping Corp.,89 the contractor's application was based
on the government's action in drastically increasing the demand for
charter ships, thus sending the market rate up and leading to drastic
1332 C.F.R. § 17.204-2(b) (1974). See also 41 C.F.R. § 1-17.204-2(b) (1974).
32 C.F.R. § 17.204-2(b) (1974).
NCAB (27 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR 147.
' Id. 147, at 1.
',NASACAB (6 June 1969), 2 ECR
87. See also Cheek's Maintenance Serv. Co.,
ACAB 1092 (19 Mar. 1969), 2 ECR 80.
2 ECR 87, at 7.
" NCAB (8 Feb. 1968), 2 ECR
52.
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cost increases such as wages. Again the Board determined that the
action complained of was a sovereign act:
No allegation is made by the Contractor that the Government's 'direction of the vessel was contrary to the terms of the
subject Contract. It is clear that the other Government actions
cited were not directed primarily at the Contractor and were
not taken by the Government in its capacity as the other contracting party; nor were they otherwise of such a nature as to
warrant an amendment without consideration under Public
Law 85-804. Accordingly, no grounds for relief on the basis of
Government action are established 0
An exception to the rule exists, however, and a contractor may be
granted relief, if he can establish some additional government act in
a contractual capacity apart from the inflationary price increases. For
example, in Alabama Industries, Inc.," drastic cost increases were
coupled with the government's exercise of an option, at a time when
the government knew that the contractor would suffer a tremendous
loss thereby. These facts were found to constitute the requisite "government action." 2 Other cases suggest that a similar result might be
reached if inequitable government conduct of some kind against the
particular contractor can be established,93 such as failure to include
a required escalation clause," or a pre-award representation that "a
price increase would be negotiated in the event of an increase in the
"

Id.

52, at 3 (emphasis in original).

" ACAB 1150 (6 Nov. 1973), 2 ECR
92

Id.

202, at 2.

202.

The Board finds that at the time the Government unilaterally
exercised its option, the Government was placed on notice that if the
option were exercised that a loss would occur. If the facts were investigated, a disastrous financial situation would have been confirmed.
The Board determined that under these circumstances it was not in
the interest of the Government to require performance under the option so as to cause the financial ruin of the company. Accordingly, the
Board finds that in fairness there should be some adjustment to the
contract.

Id.
The contractor also alleged that defective Government furnished equipment contributed to this loss. Relief was apparently based on "government action" and "essentiality."
" R. E. Lee Elec. Co., NASACAB (6 June 1969), 2 ECR 87, at 7; Cheek's
Maintenance Serv. Co., ACAB 1092 (19 Mar. 1969), 2 ECR 80, at 4-5.
11Cf. Cheek's Maintenance Serv. Co., ACAB 1092 (19 Mar. 1969), 2 ECR 80, at
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minimum wage."" Other government actions of a similar nature
might be prolonged delays between hid opening and award, delay in
furnishing notice to proceed, or delay in approval of first article samples or of subcontracted supplies or materials. Any of these government actions, and others, may create valid future exceptions to the
sovereign act rule.
On a broader plane, the sovereign act rule itself is a legal doctrine
transplanted from federal procurement law96 and has no logical role
to play where purely equitable considerations are at issue." It serves
as nothing more than an arbitrary bulwark to confine the otherwise
broad sweep of the "government action" remedy. Although the risk
of a flood of applications for relief exists in today's unparalleled inflation crunch, policy makers in the Defense Department and in the
other departments and agencies should nonetheless consider whether
a more flexible approach might not better serve the government's
interests. The Department of Defense policy memorandum of June
12, 1974,11 may at least provoke some thoughtful reconsideration of
this issue.

V. THE RESiDuAL PowERs
Departments and agencies have narrowed by regulation the broad
sweep of Public Law 85-804 and limited residual action for the most
part to the categories described earlier in this article. What remains
of the statute outside the explicit regulatory provisions is known as
the "residual powers." 99
Although often invoked by contractors in their Public Law 85-804
applications,'0 the residual powers have seldon been relied upon by
the Contract Adjustment Boards in their decisions. In one case,' °' a
contractor submitted his application under "formalization of an informal commitment,' 0 2 but the Board expressed doubt as to the
,5Id.

80, at 5.

E.g., Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925).
' As late as 1967, it was unclear what the regulation meant, and whether it in
fact established a "sovereign act" rule at all. See Jansen, Public Law 85-804 and
ExtraordinaryContractualRelief, 55 GEo. L.J. 959, 981-83 (1967).
" See note 38 supra.
" 32 C.F.R. §§ 17.302, 303 (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 1-17.300 (1974).
10 E.g., ITT Arctic Serv., Inc., AFCAB 219 (19 June 1973), 2 ECR 191; H.
Halvorson, Inc., ACAB 1121 (26 Oct. 1971), 2 ECR 146; Building Contractors, Inc.,
ACAB 1112 (27 April 1970), 2 ECR 112; Jaragua S.A., ACAB 1087 (10 April 1968), 2
ECR 59.
"I Samdo Forest Co., AFCAB 188 (17 Aug. 1966), 2 ECR 16.
102
32 C.F.R. § 17.204-4 (1974).
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applicability of that provision, and granted relief alternatively
"under its residual powers" on the grounds that the contractor had
furnished necessary goods to the Air Force but for which he had not
been paid."°3 In a similar situation, a contractor completed work in
excess of the contract limitation without an informal commitment.
The Board's decision under its residual powers was based on the fact
that immediate completion of the work undoubtedly saved a substantial amount of government funds and was "in the best interests of the
Government . ."101 In yet another case, the Board again failed to
find a basis for relief under an "informal commitment," but stated
that it had the general power to act in unusual cases if action was
warranted.' The Board found justification for granting relief in the
fact that the contractor was a foreign national and that relations
would be enhanced "by providing a procedure whereby misunderstandings arising overseas concerning defense procurement may be
resolved."'
With these few exceptions, Boards appear reluctant to abandon
the fairly precise regulations governing categories of remedial action.
They are hesitant to set themselves adrift with little more than the
statute to guide them. Thus, there are no inflation cases explicitly
resting on the remedial powers,"07 notwithstanding the unquestioned
sufficiency of the statute to meet the inflation situation. Explicit
guidance well beyond the Department of Defense policy memorandum of June 12, 1974,108 would appear to be required if Boards are to
be encouraged to meet the inflation problem head on through use of
the residual powers.
VI.

RELIEF AVAILABLE TO SUBCONTRACTORS

Regulations provide that any person seeking an adjustment may
file a request with the appropriate Board."' Accordingly, Boards have
103 2

ECR T 16, at 6-7.
Anderson Bros. Lumber Co., AFCAB 189 (6 Oct. 1966), 2 ECR 5 18, at 3.
101Jin Up Kim, ACAB 1103 (15 July 1969), 2 ECR T 92.
orId. 92, at 3.
2; Atlas Fabrica"o But cf. INDUS, GmbH, ACAB 1152 (9 Jan. 1974), 3 ECR
192; Advance Maintenance Corp.,
tors, Inc., AFCAB 220 (3 July 1973), 2 ECR
AFCAB 205 (21 April 1970), 2 ECR 111. The reasoning in all of these cases is unclear
enough to permit a "residual powers" interpretation.
10 See note 38 supra.
103 32 C.F.R. § 17.207-1 (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 1-17.207-1 (1974); 41 C.F.R. § 1804

may
17.105-1 (1974). The AEC regulation provides explicitly that "[A] request ...
be made by any party who performs services for or furnishes material or facilities to
the AEC, either directly or indirectly." 41 C.F.R. § 9-17.207-1 (1974).
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uniformly accepted applications by subcontractors, though they are
generally submitted through and sponsored by the prime contractor."0 However, agreement by the prime does not appear to be a firm
requirement. In Aeronca Manufacturing Corp., "I the Army Board
found that there are situations where direct requests from subcontractors are appropriate:
. . . while AERONCA is a subcontractor rather than a prime
contractor, it is also well settled that relief may be granted to
a subcontractor in an appropriate case . . . . Although the
examples of the types of cases listed in Section XVII of ASPR
do not deal with an application for relief submitted directly by
a subcontractor (instead of through a prime contractor) they
are not considered to exclude other cases where the Board
determines that the circumstances warrant action (ASPR 17204.1) .112
In another case, direct relief was afforded to a subcontractor where
the prime contractor refused to cooperate."' Hence, there should be
no barrier to the direct submission by subcontractors of inflation
cases under Public Law 85-804.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The promise of Public Law 85-804 lies in the great flexibility that
it vests in the executive branch to deal with unusual and unforeseen
crises in the government contracting field"' which is otherwise so
heavily encrusted with complex regulations, decisional pitfalls, and
intricate limitations of authority. The government has not yet revealed whether it will use this authority on any substantial scale to
deal with the crunch of double-digit inflation. Past decisions of the
Contract Adjustment Boards, if followed in the future, would impose
serious limitations on the use of Public Law 85-804 in connection with
the inflation crisis.
Use of the authority, however, could and should be reasonably
broadened, with appropriate safeguards to prevent its abuse. Contractors and subcontractors should be held to a reasonable standard
110E.g., Montrose Chem. Div., Chris Craft Indus., Inc., ACAB 1119 (10 Dec. 1971),
2 ECR 149, at 3; Building Contractors, Inc., ACAB 1112 (27 April 1970), 2 ECR
112; Fidelitone Microwave, Inc., ACAB 1098 (17 April 1969), 2 ECR 82.
M ACAB 1069 (6 April 1967), 2 ECR T 32.
32, at 5.
112 Id.
,, Elgin Nat'l Watch Co., ACAB 1064-A (20 Oct. 1965), 1 ECR 225.
' See Jansen, Public Law 85-804 and ExtraordinaryContractualRelief, 55 GEO.
L.J. 959, 1016-17.
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of foreseeability, that is to the reasonably foreseeable inflation rate
as of the date of their contracts. Their performance thereafter in the
purchase of materials or components and in the provision of labor,
should be judged by a standard of the reasonably prudent businessman. Increased costs subject to redress under Public Law 85-804
should be limited to those that can be shown to be due to unforeseeable inflation in labor, materials or other costs. Conversely-to turn
the sovereign act rule around-the only inflation-based increased
costs subject to redress should be those that would have occurred
regardless of the identity of the particular contractor.
The type of remedy afforded ought equally to be subject to restraint. For example, the primary remedy could be release from the
contract where that can be accomplished equitably which generally
would be prior to the incurrence of the inflated costs. Relief in the
form of reformation and monetary compensation could be limited to
situations where release from the contract is not feasible or equitable,
or where the government's best interests require that the contract
continue.
It can be forcefully argued that this solution is itself inflationary.
However, anti-inflationary policy must give way to equitable considerations at some point. Moreover, a limited broadening of relief under
Public Law 85-804 may be less inflationary in the long run than a
wholesale exodus of commercial enterprise from the government
contracting field. This latter result, which is a distinct threat today,
would inevitably reduce competition for government business and
increase the prices the government must pay for years to come.

